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Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
1. Private employers are looking for alternatives to the present system of settling 
employment disputes that relies on expensive, time-consuming formal litigation. 
2. Alternatives to conflict and litigation should be encouraged as a matter of national 
policy. In view of the caseloads now confronting the federal courts, we urge the 
Commission to recommend that Congress not enact another employment law 
providing a cause of action in federal court without accompanying it with a fair and 
effective ADR system. Further, we urge the Commission to recommend that 
Congress review the existing employment laws to determine which ones are 
appropriate for the incorporation of ADR systems. 
3. We urge the Commission to encourage the establishment of ADR procedures, with 
sufficient flexibility to address the legitimate differences in approach which may be 
taken by different organizations. 
4. Regarding any private dispute resolution alternative, it should incorporate two basic 
principles—fairness and finality. 
5. In-house open door and peer review systems are an excellent means of getting 
disagreements handled before they become full-blown disputes that require mediation, 
arbitration or litigation to resolve. 
6. We believe mediation to be a viable option any time the parties agree to undertake it 
and that the Commission should recommend that Congress enact a law incorporating 
mediation systems in certain key employment statutes. 
7. We support the Employment Dispute Resolution Act introduced by Senator Danforth 
and Rep. Gunderson that allows one party to require FMCS-supervised mediation 
shortly before a federal civil rights lawsuit can be filed. 
8. While arbitration does not provide either plaintiffs or defendants every legal 
protection written in law, neither does a case which never gets to court in a timely 
fashion. Instead of focusing on the shortcomings of present arbitration systems, it is 
more important to ask whether the nation should continue to condone efforts to 
deprive employees of some alternative to resolve their complaint short of full blown 
litigation. If a fair neutral can resolve a dispute in a matter of days or weeks, one 
could argue that it is just as proper to require employees to use that system as it is to 
make them proceed only under existing statutory and administrative structures which 
may require months or even years. 
9. We believe federal policy should encourage arbitration as an option, but that 
arbitration should not be mandated by Congress. 
10. The federal government could establish guidelines ensuring that an arbitration system 
is fair. Once those principles are fulfilled, the employer should be allowed sufficient 
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leeway to design a system that best meets the needs of the particular situation. 
Determinations under such a system should be binding, subject to appropriate review. 
11. Federal agencies resolving employment disputes should be encouraged to establish a 
system whereby the charging party and the employer have the option to have their 
dispute decided by a mutually acceptable arbitrator under the principles outlined in 
our statement. If they agree to that procedure, then the results should be binding. 
12. ADR procedures would work well for Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. Mediation and arbitration is 
useful where there is a private right of action which can be resolved by the parties 
and there is no statutory requirement that the settlement be supervised by the agency. 
13. ADR would also work well with statutes that are based upon the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, such as the wage-hour titles of the FLSA and the Family and Medical Leave 
Act. We believe that the statutes should be amended to provide that if an individual 
has brought an action against an employer and the dispute has been resolved through 
ADR, the Labor Department should have no power to supervise the settlement nor 
disapprove it. 
14. ADR would not be appropriate for the National Labor Relations Act, Executive Order 
11246, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. These statutes have no private 
right of action, and the manner in which they have been administered has resulted in 
their caseloads being kept under control. 
Consolidation of the various enforcement activities of the federal labor-related 
agencies would not be appropriate if it is nothing more than retitling the agencies with 
a common name or merely shuttling responsibility from one agency to another. 
Consolidation, however, might merit consideration if it were accompanied by changes 
in procedures that would dramatically improve the enforcement process, such as 
providing means to screen out charges without merit, making greater use of 
administrative tribunals, developing better means of ensuring fairness in political 
appointments to those tribunals, and devising more rational penalty/remedial schemes 
that would discourage litigation in search of high-stakes jury awards, among other 
things. 
15. 
Statement of Joseph F. Vella 
On behalf of the Labor Policy Association (LPA), we appreciate the invitation to 
present this statement to the Commission on the Future of Worker/Management Relations 
regarding the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve employment disputes. 
This statement will cover the matters found in Chapter IV of the Commission's Fact Finding 
Report ("Report"). 
Appearing this morning representing the views of LPA, I am Joseph F. Vella, Vice 
President of Employee Relations for Federated Department Stores. Federated has utilized a 
variety of alternative dispute resolution procedures for resolving employment disputes, and 
we have tested and are now rolling out a peer review process at many of our locations. We 
hope that this statement and my experience with Federated's successful program will provide 
guidance on the appropriate use of ADR procedures by employees and employers to resolve 
disputes outside the more formal system of filing charges and lawsuits. 
First, we will discuss the Commission's findings about the expansion of federal EEO 
laws and the implications of these developments for caseload and costs. Second, we will 
discuss various types of ADR procedures which we feel provide fair and more efficient 
alternatives to the present court/charge processing system. Third, we will discuss alternative 
ways posed by the Report to reorganize and restructure the federal enforcement system itself. 
These include: combining agencies; establishing a specialized labor court; and using worker-
management committees for issues under OSHA, ERISA or WARN. 
Several key points should be stressed at the outset. First, private employers are 
looking at alternatives to the present system which are fairer and more efficient in resolving 
disputes. There is great frustration on the part of both employees and employers that it often 
takes months or even years to resolve disputes before the EEOC or the courts. In response, 
many employers have instituted avenues of recourse before outside neutrals to resolve claims 
that may or may not be covered by an employment law. Also, there has been a high degree 
of employee acceptance of many internal programs that allow them to voice complaints and 
have them resolved either by management or by panels including their own peers. 
We urge that alternatives to conflict and litigation should be encouraged as a matter of 
national policy. In view of the caseload now confronting the federal courts, we urge the 
Commission to recommend that Congress not enact another employment law providing a 
cause of action in federal court without accompanying it with a fair and effective ADR 
system. Further, we urge the Commission to recommend that Congress review the existing 
employment laws to determine which ones are appropriate for the incorporation of ADR 
systems. Finally, we urge the Commission to encourage the establishment of ADR 
procedures with sufficient flexibility to address the legitimate differences in approach which 
may be taken by different organizations. 
Discussion of Chapter IV/Employment Regulation, Litigation and 
Dispute Resolution 
1. Introduction 
We commend the Commission for recognizing that the expansion of employment 
discrimination statutes has placed a considerable cost burden on employers and employees. 
The Report properly asks "whether the current procedures meet the needs of ordinary 
workers who are the intended beneficiaries of such public programs."1 
LPA's members are well aware that these laws have expanded greatly in the past few 
years. We agree with the Report that the federal labor laws have developed into a 
substantially different model than the one that existed when the National Labor Relations Act 
was the nation's primary labor law. These new models usually provide a private right of 
action and reject the NLRA model of a General Counsel with unreviewable discretion to 
issue complaints and pursue claims in court. At the same time, agency and court caseloads 
are increasing due to recent legislative changes that have increased the availability of 
compensatory and punitive damages.2 
From our experience with the enforcement of these laws, we agree completely with 
the Commission's finding that: 
Implementation and enforcement of these legal rights 
against noncomplying employers requires litigation in the 
ordinary courts and/or administrative proceedings before 
specialized agencies. The dramatic surge in employment 
law disputes over the last quarter century has raised 
questions about the burden and distribution of these legal 
costs. At the same time, the complicated lengthy, and 
expensive processes involved make it difficult for many 
ordinary employees to pursue a claim through these 
administrative and court proceedings. This is especially 
true for low wage workers, and those who lack the 
1
 Report at 106. 
2
 American Bar Association officials have argued that "[t]he court system has developed big problems in the 
last two decades: There is too much law, too much litigation, too much acrimony, too much cost, and too much 
delay." Mitchell F. Dolin and Robert Sayler, "Twenty Years of Litigation," Vol. 20, No. 1 Litigation, Fall 
1993, at 6, 66-67. The authors show that the federal and state trial and appellate courts have encouraged or 
even required nonjudicial resolution of lawsuits. Successful court-sponsored mediation is particularly common. 
This experience effectively rebuts arguments that mediation is not helpful once the parties are in a litigation 
posture. 
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support of a union or other advocacy group in pursuing 
their legal rights? 
The Report also correctly recognized that there is a "considerable cost" to the present 
litigation-based system.4 Much of the cost is borne by the employers and employees who 
must pay legal fees and related expenses to pursue and defend their claims. And while some 
of that cost is borne "by employers who were guilty of violating the law:"5 
As much, if not more, of these legal expenditures are 
made by law-abiding employers defending themselves 
against non-meritorious claims and going through all the 
internal procedures and paperwork needed to demonstrate 
compliance.6 
We are encouraged that the Report recognized that various ADR systems (such as 
mediation, arbitration or newer, more informal systems) are not "being utilized to their full 
potential for dealing with issues and resolving disputes that now are being regulated by 
law."7 Thus, the Commission properly framed the issue as follows: 
For all these questions [about ADR procedures], the 
issue is not just whether there are risks and costs to these
 v 
private alternatives. The more important issue is how 
these risks and costs of ADR compare with those now 
being experienced in the administration of employment 
law by courts and agencies.8 
Thus, when comparing various alternative models, we should bear in mind that under the 
present system, "[t]he employee-plaintiff has no other option but to expend the time and 
money needed for legal resolution of a claim. "9 
As the Report also stated, the "[e]mployer representatives who addressed the 
























must be fair and guarantee certain fundamental rights to employees."10 We agree that an 
ADR procedure must fairly and effectively address employee claims. One of our primary 
purposes today in appearing before the Commission is to address the safeguards that could be 
built into possible ADR systems to resolve employment claims. 
2. Evolution and Present State of Employment Regulation 
LPA's members can well remember when labor law and regulation meant bargaining 
with the union, resolving charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board, and dealing 
with wage and overtime issues under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In today's regulatory 
world, however, NLRA cases are only a small part of the issues confronting corporate 
management and general counsel offices. We agree with the Report that there has been a 
dramatic increase in federal statutes and agencies over the past twenty-five years. As argued 
below, the NLRA enforcement model is an alternative that should be considered for use in 
other employment-related statutes. 
We also agree that this increase has "creat[ed] a complex and expensive set of 
requirements for employers to administer and for employees in pursuit of their legal 
rights."11 Not only did Title VII, the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination Act of 
1967 bring new workplace protections, court decisions read those statutes expansively. 
Further, protections were added by OSHA, MSHA and ERISA. In the midst of this 
expansion, state courts began to erode the employment-at-will doctrine, allowing new 
workplace tort and contract actions. 
Most recently, several new statutes have been added, such as IRCA, WARN, the 
Polygraph Protection Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). As noted below, 
the ADA alone has brought forth so many charges that it is having a great impact in 
increasing the EEOC's already tremendous backlog. 
Another litigation growth area not mentioned in the Report is the increasing trend of 
unions as defendants in lawsuits. Unions now have to contend with a burgeoning number of 
duty of fair representation cases brought by their own members who are not satisfied that the 
union has properly represented their interests. Another unresolved area is the conflicting 
duty of the union representing its members generally, while still fulfilling its obligation to be 
involved in the reasonable accommodation of members who may have claims under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. Often there is tension between existing seniority, absence 
and light duty policies, and the need to treat disabled employees differently from other 
bargaining unit employees. This tension, which is built into the ADA, is now beginning to 
show up in litigation and has yet to be effectively resolved by guidance from the EEOC and 
the NLRB. 
10
 Report at 118 and n. 19. 
11
 Report at 109. 
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The Report also fails to point out that union violence often can lead to protracted 
litigation. As LPA has testified previously before the Commission, union violence should be 
curtailed by new legislation and increased use of NLRB injunctions. The need for such 
action is seen by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent action in vacating a $52,000,000 criminal 
contempt fine against the United Mine Workers on the basis that such a fine is punitive and 
can be imposed only through criminal proceedings.12 
Accordingly, as an exception to our general endorsement ADR procedures, LPA 
members feel strongly that stricter court and/or agency procedures are needed to curb 
violence and other wrongdoing committed outside the available dispute resolution procedures. 
3. The Nature of Employment Regulation 
LPA concurs with the Report's general conclusion that handling and resolving 
disputes under these various law enforcement vehicles requires "considerable financial 
expenditures from employers, the employees and the public."13 As the Report states: 
A conservative estimate is that for every dollar 
transferred in litigation to a deserving claimant, another 
dollar must be expended on attorney fees and other costs 
of handling both meritorious and non-meritorious claims 
under the legal procedure. Employers regularly spend 
much more than these direct costs of litigation to develop 
new personnel practices, operational procedures and 
equipment, and other measures to comply with 
regulations.14 
LPA's members are in the forefront of developing such policies and want to make it 
clear that they support fair and even-handed enforcement of these laws. Thus, we support 
the Commission's conclusion: 
Most employers and union representatives support the 
social goals of workplace laws and regulations but see 
them as highly complex and unresponsive to their needs. 
They would like to see a more service-oriented approach 
adopted to the administration and enforcement of 
workplace laws and regulations.15 
12
 //i/7 Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, No. 92-1625, 62 U.S.L.W. 4705 (June 30, 
1994). 
13
 Report at 109. 
14
 Report at 110. 
15
 Report at 111. 
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The Commission properly cited the statement of the Republican members of the House 
Education and Labor Committee that the Commission "should seek to untangle the legal web 
of regulation that has spawned a cottage-industry for lawyers, consultants, and employment 
policy specialists."16 
We also agree with the Report that "law-abiding employers need protection against the 
unfair competition from non-complying employers' lower labor costs."17 What is extremely 
disturbing, however, is that the existing laws do not give sufficient encouragement to the 
development of procedures to resolve employment disputes outside the "charge/agency/court 
litigation" arena. We would much rather expend resources on a fairer, simpler and quicker 
ADR procedure than pay our attorneys to engage in heavy-duty litigation. 
4. Trends in Employment Litigation 
The findings in this section are among the most important in Chapter IV of the 
Report, because they strongly bolster a conclusion that the present system cannot adequately 
handle the caseload generated by federal and state employment-related actions. Moreover, 
the system is costly, too time-consuming, and often denies relief to the low-income employee 
most in need of protection. 
The Commission correctly notes the great increase in both federal statutory litigation 
(five times greater than twenty years ago) and the increase in state wrongful discharge claims 
("employees are now filing 10,000 or so wrongful dismissal suits annually, with a total of 
25,000 such cases now pending").18 Also, the Commission is right on point in stating that 
lawsuits filed in court are only "the tip of the legal iceberg," and that the administrative 
backlog in the federal agencies "imposes legal costs on the targeted employers, many of 
whom turn out to be fully in compliance with the law."19 The EEOC's current caseload 
difficulties are a prime example, and set out below are the EEOC's most current enforcement 
statistics. 
Obviously disturbing are the Commission's findings that access to legal relief is not 
uniformly distributed across the labor force, "especially under those laws that require the 
individual employees to initiate a lawsuit to secure a binding ruling."20 The Commission, 
moreover, made the following conclusion: 
Report at 111 n. 5. 
Report at 109. 
Report at 112. 
Report at 112. 
Report at 112. 
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Access to the legal relief through the courts is limited for 
the majority of employees whose earnings are too low to 
cope with the high costs and contingency fee 
arrangements of private lawyers.21 
Indeed, even the prospect of high jury awards has its downside for the individual plaintiff: 
"[t]he overall pattern of jury awards . . . display [s] a rather lottery-like response to the 
harms inflicted on individual employees."22 
Particularly troubling are the most current statistics on the EEOC's caseload released 
on September 9, 1994. The EEOC's difficulties may have reached the level of a crisis, as it 
is the lead agency enforcing some of our most important statutes—Title VII, the Equal Pay 
Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. The EEOC's jurisdiction covers not only private employers, but also 
federal and state public employees. Further, on July 26, 1994, the ADA's coverage was 
expanded from the 264,000 employers with 25 or more employees to cover all 666,000 
businesses with 15 or more employees. 
This September 9, at the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 1994, the EEOC had 
an inventory of 92,396 charges awaiting investigation. This represents a 30.6 percent 
increase over the 71,733 charges pending at the end of the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1993. 
The EEOC also stated: 
Since implementation of the ADA and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, which provides enhanced relief under 
EEOC-enforced statutes to victims of intentional 
discrimination, the agency's pending inventory has risen 
100.1 percent. Officials estimate it would take 17.9 
months to process the charges in EEOC's current 
inventory, without any new incoming charges—an all 
time high for the 13 years that months of inventory have 
been tracked.23 
This increase in charges is reflected in the average workload of individual EEOC 
investigators, which grew from 62.98 cases in FY 1993 to 96.3 cases at the end of the third 
quarter of FY 1993. Thus, even before the recent upsurge in charges, on average, each 
investigator would have to resolve a case about every 3.8 days—working 7 days a week. 
Obviously, this is an impossible task and shows why the EEOC's backlog of cases is 
increasing at such a rapid rate. 
21




 "EEOC's Pending Inventory Grows to Over 92,000 Charges," EEOC Press Release, September 9, 1994 
(emphasis added). 
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A recent report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) confirms that the EEOC is 
facing a crisis in caseload management.24 The GAO found that: 
From 1989 to 1992, the number of ADEA charges that 
EEOC received for processing increased about 25 
percent; the number of charges received for processing 
under other nondiscrimination laws increased about 26 
percent. During this same period, EEOC's staff 
decreased 6 percent. For fiscal year 1993, the number 
of all charges received for processing, including those 
under the ADEA, increased another 25 percent over 
fiscal year 1992, with a staff increase of less than 2 
percent.25 
Based on this statistical evidence and discussions with EEOC officials, the GAO 
concluded that the time needed for the EEOC to process a charge will increase dramatically: 
The amount of time a person may wait to have EEOC 
process a discrimination charge under the ADEA and the 
other discrimination laws could more than double and 
approach 21 months by fiscal year 1996. The current 
trend of steadily increasing workload without 
commensurate increases in resources is expected to 
continue. As a result, unless substantial changes occur 
in EEOC's responsibilities, policies, and/or practices, it 
is likely that processing times will increase.26 
It is unrealistic at this time, however, to expect Congress to increase the EEOC's 
budget to any significant degree and provide sufficient additional enforcement resources to 
help clear its backlog. Indeed, in a surprise move, House and Senate conferees recently 
reduced the EEOC's appropriation to less than the amount that had been approved earlier by 
each body. EEOC's FY 1995 appropriation of $233 million is almost $13 million less than 
the amount requested by the Clinton Administration, and only $3 million more than the 
agency's FY 1994 appropriation. Initially, the House had approved an appropriation of $238 
million and the Senate had approved $240 million. 
Obviously, at a time when the EEOC's charge intake has been increasing 
substantially, along with an attendant increase in the backlog of pending charges, the budget 
decrease will be a difficult pill for the EEOC to swallow. Congress' action also comes at a 
24
 EEOC's Expanding Workload: Increases in Age Discrimination and Other Charges Call for New 
Approach, Report to the Chairman, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, General Accounting Office 
Report No. GAO/HEHS-94-2, February, 1994. 
25





time when the agency still awaits the confirmation of its new Chair (Gilbert Casellas) and 
two new commissioners (Paul Steven Miller and Paul Igasaki). Accordingly, for almost two 
years into the Clinton Administration, the EEOC has lacked political direction on how to deal 
with its administrative and enforcement problems. 
The caseload crisis at the EEOC has become much worse since 1992 when Rep. Steve 
Gunderson (R-WI) co-sponsored a bill along with Sen. John C. Danforth (R-MO) to 
encourage mediation prior to the filing of an employment discrimination suit. Rep. 
Gunderson, along with 22 cosponsors, reintroduced the bill in 1993, and Sen. Danforth did 
so in 1994. (See below, pages 17-20). Rep. Gunderson stated: 
Congress has to be honest with itself. It cannot continue 
to pass new anti-discrimination statutes, to underfund the 
enforcement agencies, and then ignore the burden it has 
put on the federal court dockets.27 
To be candid, however, it is unlikely that Congress will cut back on the types of claims that 
can be brought under the EEO laws; but it is extremely likely that there will be attempts to 
expand their coverage. Also, given fiscal constraints, it is unlikely that Congress will be 
able to appropriate anywhere near enough funding to significantly cut the EEOC's caseload. 
In short, there is a strong likelihood that the present statutory system of resolving 
employment discrimination claims will exacerbate the delay, frustration and contentiousness 
that is being caused by the ever-increasing volume of charges. On the other hand, there are 
a number of ADR possibilities whose use could ably and fairly assist in resolving these 
claims in a manner that is acceptable to both employees and employers. 
Former and current EEOC officials as well as civil rights experts have suggested 
several options that they believe would improve the federal government's ability to enforce 
employment discrimination laws. The one mentioned most often is increased use of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) approaches such as mediation.28 We now turn to the 
Commission's discussion of private ADR procedures. 
5. Private Dispute Resolution Alternatives 
This section of the Report deals briefly with various types of ADR procedures, such 
as informal problem solving processes, peer review panels, ombudsman systems, grievance 
procedures, mini-trial, mediation and arbitration. The Commission noted that: 
27
 Cong. Rec. E3206 (October 9, 1992). The Danforth/Gunderson mediation bill is discussed below at pp. 
15-18. 
28
 GAO Report No. GAO/HEHS-94-2, at 2. 
• 
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Practitioners of ADR suggest that these procedures work 
best when integrated into a system that begins with 
effective organizational policies and practices that limit 
occurrence of problems before they arise, provides 
informal processes for individual and group problems-
solving of issues or conflicts that do arise, and includes 
formal appeal and dispute resolution procedures.29 
We agree with that statement as demonstrating the importance of supporting these internal 
procedures. 
Basic Fairness and Finality Should Be Provided 
The Commission also notes that for these procedures to be used to full advantage, 
they need to have appropriate due process features. Also, the neutrals who help resolve 
these claims must have sufficient expertise to warrant deference to their decisions by the 
public agencies and courts responsible for the laws involved. The Commission also stresses 
the participation by the parties in its design and oversight. From our own experience at 
Federated, all these points are commendable and are compatible with successful ADR 
systems supported by the Labor Policy Association. 
Before discussing the various ADR options that are available, we would like to 
discuss two basic and extremely important principles—fairness and finality. An unfair 
system is not likely to be used by the employees and, even if it is, there is high likelihood of 
the system, or the outcome in a particular case, being set aside by a court or agency. At the 
same time, once a fair system is used to address and resolve the dispute, we recommend that 
there be a presumption that the result should be enforced, absent a serious mistake of fact or 
law. 
Numerous specific concerns about the fairness of arbitration will be addressed in 
more detail below. At the outset, however, there are several basic principles of fairness that 
often are quoted as being necessary components of any fair ADR procedure, such as the 
internal company procedures discussed in this section. One example of fairness principles is 
found in the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Renny v. Port Huron Hospital:30 
29
 Report at page 113. For further examination of the issues, the Report cites (at page 113 n. 10), Douglas 
S. McDowell, Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques: Options and Guidelines to Meet Your Company's 
Needs, Washington, DC: The Employment Policy Foundation, 1993. 
30
 427 Mich. 415,437, 398 N.E.2d 327, 338 (1986), cited in David Ewing, Justice on the Job, at 93; and 
Alan F. Westin and Alfred G. Feliu, Resolving Employment Disputes Without Litigation at 265, Bureau of 
National Affairs, Washington, D.C. 1988. Another format for fairness was described in the April 6, 1994, 
testimony of Prof. Theodore J. St. Antoine, where he argued that with some adaptation, the Commission could 
recommend the "due process" standards of § 101(a)(5) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
(Landrum-Griffin) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), dealing with internal union disciplinary proceedings. Section 
101(a(5) provides: 
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a. Adequate notice to the employees who will be bound by 
the adjudication; 
b. The right of employees to present evidence freely, and to rebut 
the evidence and arguments offered by the other side; 
c. A formulation by the company tribunal at its hearing of 
the personnel rules in question and of the facts relevant 
to those rules; 
d. Specification of the point at which the tribunal renders its final 
decision; and, 
e. Other procedural elements as may be necessary to ensure 
a means to determine the matter in question. These will 
be determined by the complexity of the matter in 
question, the urgency with which the matter must be 
resolved and the opportunity of the parties to obtain 
evidence and formulate legal contentions. 
Any ADR system will not be fair or successful unless the parties are notified of the basic 
procedures to be followed, are aware of the basic rules to be applied, and have sufficient 
rights to participate in the proceedings 
In-House Open Door and Peer Review Systems 
Before proceeding to mediation and arbitration, we touch briefly on in-house open 
door or peer review systems similar to the system we use at several locations within 
Federated. These systems did not receive much discussion in the Report, but they have 
proven extremely useful in resolving employment disputes without the intervention of outside 
neutrals (such as mediators or arbitrators). Typically, these systems apply internal 
performance or other standards and give the employees an opportunity to challenge 
employment decisions that they feel are unfair or inconsistent with company policy. 
(5) Safeguards against improper disciplinary action 
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, 
or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization 
or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with 
written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; 
(C) afforded a full and fair hearing. 
Professor St. Antoine's testimony also may ease concerns about the fairness of arbitration to resolve statutory 
claims. Citing several federal judges (Harry Edwards, Alvin Rubin, Betty Fletcher) he argued in favor of the 
desirability of an increasing resort to private arbitration to resolve statutory claims. (April 6 testimony, at 9-10). 
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We urge the Commission to strongly encourage such procedures, in part because they 
may resolve what could blossom into full blown statutory lawsuits. These systems also 
provide a way for employees to have a hearing on complaints that may have some validity, 
but may not be covered by any specific statute. 
It is our understanding that these systems may or may not resolve statutory claims of 
discrimination based on race, sex, disability, etc. Moreover, these systems often are 
voluntary, and their success depends upon whether the employees feel that the systems are 
fair and respond to their legitimate concerns. 
To generalize, such systems can be successful if they include basic fairness, 
including: 
a timely, accessible, and inexpensive process; the right to 
present evidence and rebut charges made by the other side; as 
much privacy and confidentiality as is practicable; a fair and 
impartial fact-finding process and hearing; a decision that is 
objective and reasonable plus corrective action if such is called 
for; and freedom from retaliation for using the procedure.31 
These systems have the advantage of being prompt, efficient and inexpensive. They also use 
company employees and managers whose knowledge of can provide a check on decisions that 
may be well-intended but contrary to company policy, or simply wrong, poorly reasoned, or 
unethical. Even if statutory claims are not directly addressed, employees who might 
otherwise have filed discrimination charges often will abide by the in-house resolution of the 
complaint because they have had a fair opportunity to have their side of the story heard. 
"Open Door" policies, for example, set up procedures for employees to approach high 
level officials and voice a complaint. Employees are assured that prompt action will be taken 
and that their complaints are a matter of high priority for the company's top management. 
"Peer review" systems most often are used to enforce or apply company standards or 
procedures. Peer review systems are particularly useful in connection with employee 
involvement programs that give much autonomy to nonmanagement employees. As discussed 
more fully below, we recommend that employee involvement in ADR design be permitted, 
but not required. 
Examples of the types of complaints resolved by peer review systems include: 
disciplinary actions or corrective counseling; failure to meet quality or quantity of production 
standards; and terminations or discharges for violations of company policy. 
The issues under peer review systems are resolved by a panel of employees and 
managers who are specially trained to participate in the system. These panels have the 
31
 David Ewing, Justice on the Job, at p. 6. Ewing's book provides a broad, detailed overview of in-house 
systems along with case studies of the systems used by several companies. 
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authority to review management actions and to grant, modify within policy, or deny the 
employee's request, and the panel's majority decision is binding on the employer. In some 
programs, individuals who opt to have their claims heard by a peer review panel agree to be 
bound by the panel's decision, but this is not essential to an effective programs. Peer review 
systems have been quite successful at many companies and undoubtedly have resolved 
disputes that otherwise might have been taken to the EEOC or the courts. 
We now turn to ADR systems that use outside professionals {e.g., mediators or 
arbitrators) to help resolve employment disputes in the nonunion setting. 
6. Mediation 
Mediation typically involves the services of a trained neutral who assists the parties to 
negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement. Unlike arbitration, mediation is not merit based. 
The mediator does not render a decision and does not bind the parties to any particular 
solution. In mediation, the parties control whether or not to settle. Because of its informal 
nature, mediation often can be used on an ad hoc basis to deal with specific cases. Thus, 
mediation often is an ideal first step in using ADR procedures both before or after a charge 
or lawsuit is filed. 
The Commission correctly described the advantages of successful mediation: 
Mediation, if successful, is advantageous to both sides. 
They get firm resolution of their legal conflict without 
the expense and delay of protracted litigation, and on 
terms that the parties themselves control, rather than 
being subject to the judgment of an outside tribunal 
applying public law. Mediators often provide real 
assistance in settlement negotiations by facilitating private 
conversations that explore the zone for a "win-win" 
consensus among the two sides. These potential gains 
are the reason the EEOC and the Department of Labor 
have been experimenting with mediation of employment 
law suits.32 
We also concur with the Commission's finding that "mediation would be a valuable tool for 
resolving disputes in order to cut back on the case backlog of the federal agencies. "33 
Report at 114. The EEOC's Pilot Project is described in more detail below at pages 14-16. 
Report at 114. 
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We take issue, however, with the Commission's attempt to identify some "key point" 
in the litigation process where mediation apparently would be optimal.34 The Report 
recommends that mediation at some midpoint, where the parties know enough about the case 
to make intelligent judgments. We would point out, however, that the EEOC's Pilot 
Mediation Program was fairly successful even when the charging party chose mediation 
shortly after the charge was filed. 
In our view mediation may be a viable option anytime the parties agree to undertake 
it. Thus, we prefer the option set out in the Report recognizing that the most propitious time 
for mediation can "vary considerably from case to case."35 
For these reasons, LPA concurs with the Commission's alternate recommendation that 
the agency should have a group of "seasoned outsiders" available to help the parties in 
possible settlement negotiations.36 The Commission should recommend that mediation be 
made available at the parties' option anytime after a charge is filed. 
The Commission also seems to recommend against mediation where pre-trial costs 
have been incurred and the parties have committed to litigation.37 We disagree. The 
federal courts are having a great deal of success in ordering mediation of cases after 
litigation has been filed and even after an appeal has been lodged. 
For these reasons, we encourage the Commission to endorse the Danforth/Gunderson 
approach that would allow one party to require FMCS-supervised mediation shortly before a 
federal civil rights lawsuit can be filed. See pp. 17-20, below. 
We also agree with the Commission's point that the mediator should come from 
outside the agency and that "the parties could be assured that what the mediator learned from 
them would not figure in the agency's decisions about whether to pursue charges or file a 
lawsuit. "38 Indeed, in most mediations, the parties sign a confidentiality agreement. 
Several state statutes expressly protect the confidentiality of mediation-related 
communications, often protecting the mediator from being forced to testify about the 
mediation in any other proceeding. 
The following discussion of the EEOC's Pilot Mediation Program and the 
Danforth/Gunderson mediation bill will provide further details on how mediation could be 
used from the time a charge is filed until just before a lawsuit is begun. 
34
 Report at 114. 
35




 Report at 114. 
38
 Report at 114. 
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a. The EEOC's Pilot Mediation Program 
On April 1, 1993, the EEOC began a pilot mediation program at four local offices: 
Houston, New Orleans, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. We strongly supported the 
program and several LP A member companies mediated disputes under the EEOC's auspices. 
The pilot program was set up and run by the Center for Dispute Settlement (CDS), a private 
mediation firm based in Washington, D.C. 
The Pilot Program now is complete and the results are being analyzed. A final report 
has been prepared by a consultant and given to the EEOC. The Commission, however, will 
not release the final results of the program until the Senate confirms the three pending 
nominations to the EEOC, and they have reviewed the recommendations. 
Preliminary figures were based on 284 charges referred for mediation. Of these, 17 
were settled before mediation actually began, and 156 (52 percent) were resolved 
successfully in mediation. Moreover, the overall processing time for mediated charges was 
67 days. Mediation sessions averaged about 3.6 hours, with several additional hours for 
preparation. By comparison, the average time to process an EEOC charge is now 293 days 
compared to 274 days one year ago. Also, the General Accounting Office projected earlier 
this year that by FY 1996, the average time to process an EEOC charge could more than 
double and approach 21 months. The speed of these mediations contrasts markedly with 
EEOC's average charge processing time of 294 days in FY 1993 and the projected time of 
608 days in FY 1996.39 
The pilot project, however, is now complete, and there no longer is a mediation 
program in place at the EEOC. Moreover, as only 267 charges were mediated, the program 
made hardly a dent in the 87,942 charges filed in FY 1993 alone. Without greatly increased 
funding and encouragement from the EEOC and Congress, it is unlikely that the EEOC will 
use third party neutrals to the extent required to have any appreciable effect on the EEOC's 
backlog. 
There were several features of the EEOC's pilot program that may be of interest to 
this Commission. For example: 
1. Mediation did not take place until a charge was filed. This 
feature helped avoid confusion over when a charge would have 
to be filed in order to be timely under the relevant statute. 
2. Mediation was not conducted by EEOC officials. Rather, 
outside mediators were used. This feature was designed to 
encourage the parties to be open and candid with the mediator. 
This feature thus differs from statutory "conciliation" where the 
EEOC tries to resolve a case before filing a suit. Many 
employers find that conciliation with an agency that can use the 
GAO Report at 7. 
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information in its lawsuit against the employer often is a 
disincentive to a candid assessment of the parties' cases. 
3. Participation was voluntary on both sides. If mediation was 
agreed to, the EEOC suspended its investigation until the 
mediation was complete. The parties had up to 60 days to 
complete the mediation. 
4. Although it was not required, each party could bring an attorney 
or any other representative to the mediation. Also, the parties 
could consult with an attorney or representative at any time 
during the mediation or before signing an agreement. 
5. Information presented in the mediation was confidential and was 
not subject to EEOC subpoena. This feature conforms to the 
Report's recommendation on page 114. 
6. If the mediation resulted in a written agreement, that agreement 
became an enforceable contract. 
One concern about the pilot program, however, was that the mediation took place 
shortly after the charge was filed and was not available later in the investigation. As noted 
above, we recommend that in addition to early mediation, mediation be available at any time 
while the case is before the EEOC or prior to a lawsuit being filed. 
b. The Danforth/Gunderson Mediation Bill 
As noted above, we strongly recommend that the Commission encourage the approach 
taken in The Employment Dispute Resolution Act ("EDRA"). Experienced litigators and 
judges recognize that mediation may be particularly helpful if it occurs just before a lawsuit 
is filed so that an experienced professional can make the parties take a good, hard look at 
their cases to see if litigation makes legal or financial sense. That is the purpose of the 
proposed legislation. 
The EDRA is a bipartisan bill, introduced in both the House and Senate, that would 
encourage the use of mediation shortly before the filing of a federal employment 
discrimination lawsuit. The bill was introduced in 1992 by Sen. John Danforth (R-MO)(S. 
3356) and Rep. Steve Gunderson (R-WI)(H.R. 6197). Rep. Gunderson reintroduced the bill 
in 1993 (H.R. 2016) along with a bi-partisan group of 22 co-sponsors.40 On July 28, 1994, 
Sen. Danforth introduced the same bill (S. 2327). Previously, Sen. Danforth, the author of 
40
 Rep. Gunderson's remarks on the Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 1993 are found at El 181 Cong. 
Rec. (May 6, 1993). 
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l 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, urged this Commission to consider this mediation model to 
resolve disputes.41 
The EDRA provides a Congressional finding that "cooperative mediation of charges is 
a more time-saving and cost-effective method of resolving disputes than litigation of civil 
actions." As Rep. Gunderson explained: 
It is no secret that excessive, and in many cases 
unnecessary litigation is hurting the American economy. 
The rest of the world, frankly, looks on in amazement at 
the time and the resources Americans dedicate to suing 
one another. Litigation is costing America, collectively, 
between $60 and $100 billion a year. We all pay that 
bill. We pay it through higher prices, lost jobs and 
wages, diminished economic competitiveness, and a 
clogged and increasingly unresponsive justice system. 
The EDRA provides that any party involved in a claim of discrimination under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, could insist that the claim be submitted to mediation before a lawsuit could be filed. 
The bill thus provides a substantial incentive for employers, as well as potential plaintiffs, to 
resolve cases before litigation. 
If the EEOC (or State/local agency) issues a right-to-sue letter, or determines that it 
will sue the respondent, the EEOC will so notify the parties, who will have up to 14 days to 
request that the dispute be submitted to mediation. A suit cannot be filed during this 14-day 
period. Similarly, no suit could be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 unless the plaintiff has 
given the defendant at least 60 days written notice and informed the defendant that either 
party may request that the complaint be referred to the FMCS for mediation. 
EDRA further provides that before a plaintiff can file a lawsuit, all parties shall be 
informed that any party can request mediation. Either the charging party, respondent 
employer or union, the EEOC or State/local agency could request the mediation. Similarly, 
the respondent could require the EEOC to mediate before filing suit. Once mediation was 
requested, no lawsuit could be filed for a period of 90 days. 
If the dispute were submitted to mediation, the parties would follow procedures 
established by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). The mediation 
would apply to the EEOC or State or local authority, as well as any other potential party. 
Although the mediation could be required by any potential party, any agreement 
resolving the dispute would be voluntary. The Act would not force an agreement between 
the parties. The parties would have the option of using a mediator chosen from a panel 
41
 See S3678-3679 Cong. Rec. (March 24, 1994). 
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provided by the FMCS. They also could choose their own mediator from some other source, 
such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA). 
This procedure would differ from existing Title VII "conciliation," which is required 
before the EEOC can file a suit. The existing procedure puts the EEOC in the position of 
trying to conciliate a case when, in many cases, the EEOC has made a decision that it is 
likely to file a civil action. In this situation, the employer may well see conciliation as a 
discovery device for the EEOC rather than a true attempt to settle. Sen. Danforth explained: 
by using truly neutral mediators who act as go-betweens 
rather than arbitrators, mediation is less threatening to 
employers. Thus, early settlement is more likely.42 
The EDRA further protects the plaintiffs time to file a lawsuit. If the statutory time 
period to file a lawsuit were to lapse during the mediation period, the filing period would be 
tolled, and the time to file a suit would be extended for 14 days after mediation ended. If 
the parties agreed, the 90-day mediation could be extended; and if a suit were filed, the 
judge could order additional mediation. 
As noted, the parties could not be compelled to reach an agreement. Once agreed to, 
however, the agreement would be binding and enforceable in a federal district court with 
jurisdiction over the parties. The agreement would be kept confidential unless the parties 
agreed otherwise. The charging party would receive a copy of any agreement between the 
employer and government agency. 
The bill also contains confidentiality requirements protecting all communications and 
related documents from unwarranted disclosure in any other proceedings, including requests 
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, information that usually would be 
disclosable in discovery and that was not prepared for mediation would not be confidential if 
subject to a proper discovery request. 
Under this bill, the parties still have access to traditional litigation if an agreement is 
not reached by mediation. "Thus^ the mediation alternative can be a 'no-lose' option" for the 
parties.43 
From LPA's perspective, one of the highest priorities of the Commission should be to 
encourage mediation. Neither side can be compelled to reach an agreement, and both sides 
can be represented by counsel. The EEOC pilot program and the Danforth/Gunderson bill 
certainly are serious proposals that we would strongly recommend. We would, however, add 
one final recommendation: 
42
 S17037 Cong. Rec. (October 5, 1992). 
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Some procedure should be added to assure that the individual 
parties (and not just their attorneys) are informed of these 
options and be given some realistic information on costs and 
success rates. 
7. Arbitration 
As the Report points out, arbitration is similar to court proceedings in that it requires 
a formal hearing, both sides are represented by their own chosen representative, and the 
results usually are binding on the parties. We further agree with the Report, that there are 
several advantages to arbitration when compared with litigation: 
• Arbitration can secure considerable savings in both time and 
money that must be expended for an authoritative legal 
resolution. One study found that the average arbitrator's fee 
was about $1,800; 
• Arbitration entails much less paperwork, preliminary depositions 
and motions, and post-hearing briefs and appeals; 
• The arbitration hearing can be scheduled at a time that is 
convenient for the parties and the person they have picked to 
decide their case, rather than being placed at the end of a 
crowded court docket; and, 
• "For a smaller expenditure than going to court, the parties 
entrust their fate to a decision-maker whose previous track 
record they knew about and whom they decided to use, rather 
than a jury for whom this is usually the first and last legal 
experience." 
a. Grievance Arbitration in Union Settings 
As human relations professionals, many working with unions, LPA's members are 
very familiar with the grievance-arbitration process. The Report correctly concludes that this 
procedure "meets many of the requirements of effective dispute resolution system design. ',44 
It also is true that this system has achieved a high degree of confidence from the parties and, 
and was given a strong endorsement in the U.S. Supreme Court's Steelworkers "Trilogy" of 
cases. 
44
 Report at 115-116. 
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The Report accurately finds that arbitration in this context is flexible, effective and 
relatively inexpensive.45 We would hope that the Commission would rely upon this 
commendable record in making its recommendations in the nonunion context. 
b. Grievance Arbitration in the Nonunion Setting 
1. Arbitration Should Not Be Considered in a 
Vacuum, But Should Be Considered Along With 
the Presently Overcrowded Agency And Court 
Enforcement Procedures. 
LPA's reaction to the Report's treatment of arbitration in the nonunion setting 
generally is positive. Indeed, we were pleasantly surprised with the Report, given decidedly 
negative approach to arbitration taken by the plaintiffs' bar and several of the plaintiffs' 
representatives appearing as witnesses at the Commission's April 6, 1994 hearing. 
At several points during the hearing, the panelists were asked a basic question: 
"What answer do you have to Congress' continual expansion of federal law without giving 
sufficient resources to handle the resulting caseload?" Several of the witnesses failed to 
recommend any type of ADR procedure (either voluntary or involuntary) and spent much of 
their time telling the Commissioners why they should recommend reversing the Supreme 
Court's Gilmer decision that upheld an agreement to arbitrate all employment disputes.46 
These witnesses gave rather extreme examples of unfair ADR procedures and showed no 
recognition that it possible to design a system that is fair. 
A more realistic plaintiffs attorney recognized that arbitration has many benefits over 
the present litigation system. He stated: 
Although he questioned the fairness of the [securities industry] 
arbitration procedures, [Jeffrey L. Liddle of Liddle, Robinson & 
Shoemaker] characterized the alternatives as "not appealing." 
He continued that EEOC is plagued by backlogs, as are the state 
and city human rights commissions; state courts create 
"incessant delays" under 19th century procedural rules that make 
them the "quintessential defendants' jurisdiction;" and clogged 
federal courts have referred thousands of cases to arbitration. 
We feel that the arbitration process, if allowed to function 
properly—ensuring full discovery rights, selecting qualified and 
diverse arbitrators, armed with subpoena power, and not 
enfeebled by current proposals to limit the availability of 
45
 Report at 116. 
46
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991). 
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punitive damages or the awarding of attorneys fees—can do the 
trick.47 
LPA is encouraged that the Commission did not take the negative approach and was 
not diverted by descriptions of systems that are not advocated by any responsible employer 
representative. Instead, the Report took the practical approach of comparing nonunion 
arbitration of statutory claims with their only present statutory alternative; i.e., filing a 
charge and taking on all the all the risks of expensive and time consuming litigation. The 
Commission thus made the following apt observation: 
The fact that employment arbitration is not a particularly 
voluntary procedure as far as individual employees are 
concerned is not a sufficient reason for rejecting this 
option. The alternative of litigation in court or before an 
administrative tribunal is hardly voluntary either. The 
employee-plaintiff has no other option but to expend the 
time and money needed for legal resolution of a 
claim.48 
The Report is absolutely correct that arbitration should not be considered in a vacuum 
but alongside the present system, which, in our view, has very serious problems. As noted 
above, the average EEOC case takes about one year to process, and this time will approach 
two years by 1996. Many cases will take much longer. EEOC investigators are overworked 
and may not have sufficient time to consider many of the backlogged cases. The court 
backlog will further delay resolution of the case. During this time, the employee may be out 
of a job; or be in the uncomfortable position of continuing to work while the EEOC or courts 
deal with the claim against her/his employer.49 
If the case finally gets to court, legal fees will mount and if the employee loses, he 
often will have to pay his lawyer's fees. And even if the plaintiff wins, the attorney takes a 
large part of the award to compensate the attorney for all billable hours that are needed to 
navigate the case through the agencies and courts. 
In light of these problems, it would be inappropriate to focus only on perceived 
problems with arbitration and completely ignore the shortcomings of the present system as 
several witnesses have urged the Commission to do. It is just as relevant to turn the question 
around and ask whether we can condone efforts to deprive these employees of some 
alternative to resolve their complaint. If a fair neutral can resolve a dispute in a matter of 
47
 No. 182 Daily Labor Report (BNA), September 22, 1994, at p. A-15. 
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days or weeks, one could argue that it is just as proper to require employees to use that 
system as to make them proceed only under the existing statutory and administrative 
structure. 
Second, many questions about the arbitration of EEO claims cannot yet be answered, 
either from a lack of solid evidence or because the cases are still working their way through 
the courts. A preemptive strike to forestall arbitration of discrimination claims may well 
deprive us of an alternative that has many benefits over the existing system. 
Third, arbitration should be allowed as an option but should not be mandated by 
Congress. In many circumstances, mediation or various in-house procedures may be a 
preferable alternative. 
We recognize that there are valid concerns that a system crafted by an employer must 
have proper safeguards to assure that the system is fair. Indeed, the "[e]mployer 
representatives who addressed the Commission on this topic accepted this fundamental 
principle. "50 LPA also agrees with this principle and will address these concerns below. 
Thus, one alternative that deserves consideration is to establish base-line principles of 
fairness. Once those principles are fulfilled, the employer should be allowed sufficient 
leeway to design a system that best meets the needs of the particular situation. For example, 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service could promulgate fairness standards after an 
opportunity for public comment. An arbitration procedure meeting those tests should be 
presumptively valid and determinations under such a system would be binding, subject to 
appropriate review. 
2. Establish a System That Provides Notice To a 
Charging Party That Optional Arbitration Is 
Available 
A debate has begun over whether an employer should be allowed to have a mandatory 
system of arbitration to resolve employment disputes. While that debate may take several 
years to resolve, the Commission could take a smaller, but equally significant step by 
recommending that federal agencies resolving employment disputes establish a system 
whereby the charging party and the employer have the option to have their dispute decided 
by a mutually acceptable arbitrator under the principles discussed below. If they agree to 
that procedure, then the results should be binding. This is the same approach we are 
advocating for mediation. 
As with mediation, we also urge the Commission to recommend that the individual 
parties (and not just their attorneys) should he informed of these options and be given 
realistic information on costs and success rates. 
Report at 118. 
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3. The Gilmer Decision and Mandatory Arbitration 
As much of the discussion about arbitration has been generated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., I l l S.Ct. 1647 (1991), some 
description of that decision is warranted. 
The Court's 7-2 Gilmer decision held that an employee in the securities industry who 
signed an agreement to arbitrate "any employment controversy" must arbitrate an age 
discrimination claim instead of proceeding with a suit under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Gilmer's ADEA suit thus was stayed pending arbitration 
of his claim. The Court applied the Federal Arbitration Act, whose purpose was to "place 
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."51 
The Court observed that under the arbitration procedure, "a party does not forego the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits their resolution to an arbitral rather 
than judicial forum."52 Justice White also noted that "[W]e are well past the time when 
judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals 
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. "53 
The Court in Gilmer further stated that the ADEA has a "flexible approach" to the 
resolution of claims, including "informal methods of conciliation, conference; and 
persuasion," in addition to concurrent, deferral jurisdiction which allows the claims to be 
resolved in state agencies and courts.54 
Assuming that a consensus can be reached on the elemental principles of fairness for 
arbitration procedures, a reasonable case can be made that further legislation on this issue is 
not necessary, as the issue is being handled by the federal courts who are well-qualified to 
supervise arbitration awards in the employment arena, just as they supervise awards under 
several other important statutory schemes. 
To our knowledge, much more data needs to be collected before any hard conclusions 
can be drawn as to the extent that employers have adopted mandatory arbitration for 
employment disputes. Indeed, on March 4, 1994, the House Education and Labor 
Committee requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) to initiate a comprehensive study 
of non-collectively bargained corporate personnel policies that compel arbitration of federal 
EEO claims. The Committee's letter stated that "[n]o comprehensive data has been 
51
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developed regarding the number and types of employers who have established such 
policies."55 The GAO has sent questionnaires to several hundred employers and is in the 
processing of receiving and analyzing responses. 
To be sure, some private employers have adopted mandatory arbitration procedures. 
Their experiences will be valuable in evaluating what approaches might be appropriate for 
statutory support. However, LPA has also received a large number of inquiries about ADR 
from its member companies who are considering all their options. Indeed, a great many 
employers are still gathering information and have not made a final decision. The GAO may 
well find that mandatory arbitration is not the juggernaut that some news reports indicate.56 
4. Comparison Of Arbitration With Bench Or Jury Trials 
a) Arbitration Is Quicker and Cheaper 
Most observers feel that cases can be resolved faster and much less expensively in 
arbitration than through litigation. Indeed, an arbitration system could contain a time limit 
within which a case should be referred to an arbitrator and a decision rendered. 
b) The Parties Select the Arbitrator 
The Report asks several questions about the selection of an arbitrator.57 A fair 
procedure would allow the individual employee to choose the arbitrator. Indeed, most 
arbitration systems have this characteristic. Also, most arbitration procedures allow the 
individual to pick from a roster of arbitrators. Arbitrators are available from a number of 
sources, such as the American Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service, the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) and other 
sources.58 
55
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Dallas County, Texas). See also "Woman Claims Arbiters of Bias are Biased, Too," Wall Street Journal, 
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By comparison, no party can select a judge.59 Also, jury panels are selected 
randomly. Counsel for the parties have limited ability to strike potential jurors, but in many 
jurisdictions, the court conducts the voir dire examination of jurors, thus greatly reducing 
any control the parties might have. 
In other cases, the attorneys have more control over the jury panel. Indeed, while 
trial lawyers complain of arbitrator bias, they also search for venues with the most favorable 
jury panels for their case, or they look for individual jury members they think will be 
predisposed to their side. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recently told litigants that they 
have to stop picking juries based on sex- or race-based stereotypes.60 
c) Sharing the Costs of Arbitration 
One of the more contentious issues involving arbitration is who should pay for it.61 
Critics of arbitration want it both ways. First, they argue that if the employer pays the entire 
amount, the arbitrators will be biased toward the employer. Second, they argue that 
individuals probably cannot afford to use an arbitrator, and thus are prejudiced by the 
system. They ignore the possibility that the arbitrator does not have to be aware who is 
bearing the costs and could be paid with a cashiers check that does not identify either party. 
These criticisms also fail to consider other options. For example, most would agree 
that arbitration is much less expensive than litigation. Many plaintiffs would have the 
resources to share the costs, at least on a mutually agreed upon basis. The procedure also 
could provide that if the individual was the prevailing party, the employer would pay for the 
costs of arbitration and other related expenses, such as transcripts. Indeed, if the individual 
were provided a realistic comparison between the costs of litigation and arbitration, we 
predict that arbitration would become increasingly popular fairly quickly. 
d) The Parties Can Choose Their Own Representative 
Most arbitration procedures allow the parties to pick their own attorney or some other 
representative. Thus, their rights in this regard are the same as before the EEOC or the 
Monday, September 19, 1994, at p. Bl; and "Employers Find a Tool to End Workers' Right to Sue: 
Arbitration", The Washington Post, September 19, 1994. 
AAA seems to have rebutted the allegations. According to the Wall Street Journal, the AAA's figures 
show that they have 212 men and 74 women who hear employment disputes for the AAA. Of these, 247 are 
attorneys, 76 primarily represent employers, 33 primarily represent employees, 18 represent both, and 20 are 
regulators. The remaining 139 include retired judges, labor arbitrators, professors and consultants. 
59
 The plaintiff in the Olson case probably would want to challenge the entire federal judiciary, whose 
makeup is less diverse that the AAA panels. 
60
 J.E.B. v. Alabama, Ex. Rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994). 
61
 Report at 119. 
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courts. 
e) The Parties Can Discover Information 
The Report asks whether there should a right to discovery, depositions and 
subpoenas.62 A fair procedure will provide basic rights in this area and give fair notice to 
the participants of their rights. 
Gilmer does not specifically provide guidance as to how much discovery is required 
for arbitration, although the Court did state that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration rules would "prove insufficient to allow 
ADEA claimants such as Gilmer a fair opportunity to present their claims. "63 Any fair 
arbitration procedure, at minimum, should allow the complainant access to relevant 
information and documents, his/her personnel file, some depositions and witnesses. A 
subpoena power also could be provided to give the arbitrator sufficient authority to assure 
compliance with proper information requests. 
Arbitration discovery, of course, could be made as onerous as it is under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, but then the value of arbitration may be lost: 
by agreeing to arbitrate, a party "trades the procedures and 
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 
informality, and expedition of arbitration.n64 
There is no set formula that arbitration must follow, but the procedure must be fair 
and give the complainant an adequate opportunity to develop his/her case. 
f) Significant Remedies Would Be Available In 
Arbitration 
Gilmer implied that the arbitrator in that case could award the same relief available 
under the ADEA.65 The ADEA, however, does not provide for compensatory and punitive 
damages as are now authorized by Title VII and the ADA, although it allows liquidated {i.e., 
double) damages for willful violations. Thus, Gilmer did not address whether the arbitrator 
62
 Report at 119. 
63
 111 S.Ct. at 1655. The arbitration rules of the AAA, for example, "authorize an arbitrator to subpoena 
witnesses and documents either independently or upon request of a party." Williams v. Katten, Muchen & 
Zavis, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 792, 799 (N.D. 111. 1993). 
64
 Gilmer at 1655, citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985). 
65
 111 S.Ct. at 1655. The Court stated that the NYSE rules allowed the arbitrator to award "damages 
and/or other relief," and indicated that arbitrators have the power to award "equitable relief." 
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See McDowell, Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, at 16-18. 
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Q: What about [the suggestion] that arbitration often results in 
lower and more realistic damage awards? 
A: I think that's very difficult to demonstrate. I am not at all sure 
an employer should go into the process expecting that to be true. 
Q: [Are] arbitrators less likely to be swayed by emotions or anti-
corporate sentiment and normally hesitate to award punitive or 
compensatory damages except in egregious cases? 
A: I think that's true in general but, on the other hand, arbitrators 
may be more familiar with the kinds of awards that the courts 
have been making. It may be in trying to reflect what the case 
would be worth in court they actually give a higher number than 
some jury might have.67 
There also has been a fair amount of conjecture over whether arbitrators will have a 
tendency to "split the baby" and try to give both parties something in an arbitration award. 
Thus, it may be that arbitration will not be as favorable for employers as some may assume. 
For example, it has been argued that: 
v 
arbitrators often are not lawyers and may be inclined to 
ignore prevailing law and compelling legal arguments. 
In particular, an arbitrator may be less than receptive to 
"technical" procedural arguments that are available to the 
defendant, such as statute of limitations or timely filing 
issues. Moreover, an arbitrator may be less inclined to 
follow established burden-of-proof analyses, such as the 
McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine three-step order of proof. 
Thus, a purely "legal case" may be better off in court. 
Arbitrators generally are more concerned with issues of 
basic fairness and are more likely to give the claimant 
something, even where no violation of the law occurred. 
An arbitrator is more likely to reach a "compromise" 
verdict in close cases.68 
67
 October 10, 1993, Employment Discrimination Report (BNA), at 84-86. 
68
 Bompey and Pappas, "Is There a Better Way? Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination 
Claims After Gilmer?', 19 Employee Relations L.J., Winter 1993-94 at 197, 211. The authors further argue 
that arbitrators may be less likely than judges to follow strict rules of evidence or to dismiss claims based on 
motions. 
-34-
Mr. Coulson recommends that these outcomes might be diminished if the parties selected 
arbitrators who were specialists in employment discrimination issues.69 
We cannot leave this issue without making one final, obvious observation. Even the 
least experienced arbitrator has more experience in resolving disputes than have most jurors. 
Most jurors have had no prior experience with the relevant discrimination law or any related 
enforcement proceeding. Moreover, they have no background reference as to how these 
cases are resolved or what damages are appropriate. Juries can be quite unpredictable, 
stemming in part from the fact that: 
In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts 
awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not 
be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive 
damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no 
necessary relation to the actual harm caused.70 
The jury situation is not likely to improve, but arbitrators surely will become more skilled as 
they handle more discrimination claims. 
g) Arbitrators Write Opinions; Juries Don't. 
Court Review of Arbitrator Decisions 
Could Be Enhanced 
Critics of arbitration often argue, as did Gilmer in his suit, that arbitration is deficient 
because arbitrators often do not write opinions and thus do not leave a body of precedent for 
use in other cases.71 Plaintiffs' representatives, of course, generally disfavor arbitration 
because they want a jury trial. Individual jurors may have opinions, but they don't write 
them down except to respond to interrogatories from the judge. If the plaintiffs' bar really 
wanted written opinions, they could ask for a bench trial before a judge. 
For the most part, the criticism that arbitration does not leave a body of case law is 
not only disingenuous, it has no basis in fact. Arbitrators, of course, often write opinions 
and easily could be required to do so. The arbitrator could be required to make detailed 
69
 Employment Discrimination Report, October 10, 1993, at 84-85. The GAO Securities Report found that 
the NYSE and the NASD use securities industry arbitrators who specialize in securities issues and who often 
were not familiar with employment issues. We understand that institutions outside the securities industry that 
provide arbitration panels have been more successful in broadening the demographic makeup of their arbitrators 
and increasing the availability of arbitrators with expertise in employment discrimination issues. Also, the AAA 
informs us that they have several programs in operation that have increased the diversity of their arbitral panels. 
The increase in court-annexed arbitration has further increased this pool of specialized arbitrators. Also, 
arbitration procedures that allow the parties to choose and agree upon their arbitrator would provide greater 
party control than in securities industry arbitration. 
70
 Gerz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)(Powell, J.). 
I l l S.Ct. at 1647. 
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factual findings and to make an explicit analysis of the relevant legal issues. A large number 
already do. Their opinions, numbering in the tens of thousands, are found in several hard 
copy and electronic reporting services. 
Moreover, for many legal issues, the EEOC and other agencies would continue to 
issue regulations and other policy guidance that could be evaluated by arbitrators just as they 
are by federal district judges. For example, there is a substantial body of agency guidance 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act developed by the EEOC. 
Further, arbitrators' opinions are subject to court review under either Section 301 of 
the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 185) or Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1). 
District and appellate court decisions also would be available for review. Closer scrutiny of 
arbitrator's decisions could be provided by using the same standards of review as now are 
used by the federal appellate courts to review the statutory decisions of the federal district 
courts under these same statutes. 
In such a system, the arbitrator would act more like an Administrative Law Judge, 
and the district court could review the arbitrator's decisions. Indeed, if the experience of the 
NLRB is any indication, many initial decisions would be extremely lengthy in order to 
withstand subsequent agency or court review. Of course, this could increase the expense of 
the arbitration and the caseload of the courts. 
This discussion of arbitration leads us to our final recommendation. Where the 
arbitration procedure is fair, the federal enforcement agencies should be bound by the result 
unless the decision is overturned under the appropriate court review procedure. It makes 
little sense to go through a full and fair arbitration procedure and then have the agency 
continue litigation of the claim, particularly where all parties have agreed to go through the 
arbitration procedure in the first place. 
h) Employee Participation in the Design and 
Oversight Of Arbitration Procedures 
1) Union Context 
The Report's discussion of collectively-bargained arbitration procedures was generally 
favorable. Our position would be that an employer and the collective bargaining 
representative of its employees should be able to agree to include statutory claims within the 
framework of an existing grievance-arbitration procedure. The union could be an adequate 
representative of its employees. A safeguard could be built in so that the individual could 
choose another representative to present his/her statutory case to an arbitrator if the 
individual would not be satisfied with being represented by the union. 
Under present law, a strong argument can be made that the Gilmer decision has 
undercut the continuing viability of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), 
which did not permit the results of an arbitration to be binding as to the statutory claim in 
that case. See e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1103 
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(W.D.Va. 1994), appeal pending, No. 94-1213 (4th Cir.). Moreover, the main reason that 
Gardner-Denver would not let the arbitrator's decision be binding was that the arbitrator only 
considered the contract and did not consider the statutory claim. Where the arbitration 
procedure actually covers statutory claims (such as Title VII or the ADA), then we would 
argue that Gardner-Denver is inapplicable and the arbitrator's decision should be binding. 
2) Non-Union Context 
In the non-union context, it would be much more difficult to involve the employees 
in designing the system. 
First, there is continuing uncertainty about whether Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA 
allows an employer to negotiate with its employee about wages, hours and working 
conditions with non-unionized employees. While a case can be made that employee 
involvement in designing an ADR system does not violate Section 8(a)(2), the uncertainty 
over the issue is a disincentive for many employers to involve employees in the process. If 
employee involvement were made mandatory for an ADR system to be upheld, many 
employers might opt out of ADR altogether. 
Second, we suggest that the difficulties in reaching a consensus in the design of an 
ADR system should not be overlooked. While some incorrectly think that there is mass 
movement in the employer community toward some fairly uniform ADR systems, the views 
of our own membership would indicate that such a conclusion is greatly overstated. The 
types of systems that have been adopted can vary greatly from employer to employer. 
Adoption generally comes only after a great deal of internal debate within the company about 
what type of system should be used. This is why LPA does not advocate a "one-size-fits-all" 
approach to ADR. 
The difficulties in choosing among the various options would be multiplied greatly if 
employee involvement were mandated, especially as most employees have no experience 
whatsoever in the underlying ADR concepts. 
Where there is no union to resolve the issues, it would be extremely difficult to 
decide which employees the employer should deal with. Moreover, the lack of expertise of 
employees on these issues would make it extremely difficult for them to craft a system that 
was not largely the product of the employer's design and direction anyway. This point is 
fairly obvious, and we suspect that some of the advocates of mandatory employee 
participation in ADR design realize that in many cases nothing would happen and that no 
ADR system would result. 
In individual instances, there may be some advantage in involving employees, 
particularly where such participation may increase the acceptability of the program. On 
balance, however, we conclude such participation should not be mandatory. As long as the 
system includes the requirements of fairness set out above, that system should be allowed to 
resolve statutory claims. 
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8. Application of Mediation and Arbitration Procedures to Particular 
Employment Laws 
As discussed above, we believe that ADR procedures, such as mediation and 
arbitration would be useful to resolve claims within existing statutory schemes. These 
recommendations, however, should not be read to mean that other changes in these statutes 
previously recommended by LPA should not be undertaken. Moreover, there are certain 
employment statutes whose enforcement schemes would not be benefitted by the 
incorporation of ADR procedures particularly those in which no private right of action is 
available and the agency has sole discretion over whether or not to pursue a claim. We now 
turn to specific statutes. 
a. Statutes Enforced by the EEOC 
Based on the EEOC's Pilot Mediation Project and the decided cases, we believe that 
ADR procedures would work extremely well for Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Mediation and 
arbitration is useful where there is a private right of action and there is no statutory 
requirement that the settlement be supervised by the agency. Moreover, the Gilmer decision, 
which required arbitration of ADEA claims, has been extended by the courts to cover these 
other statutes. Also, the EEOC is a charge-driven agency with a tremendous backlog that is 
not being handled very well under the existing case-handling framework. 
As indicated above, the EEOC should have a cadre of experienced neutrals available 
to resolve cases anytime after a charge is filed. Moreover, we recommend the 
Danforth/Gunderson approach under which any party can require mediation before a suit is 
filed. 
b. FLSA-Based Statutes 
LPA also recommends that ADR should be examined favorably for those statutes that 
are based upon the Fair Labor Standards Act, such as the wage-hour titles of the FLSA and 
the Family and Medical Leave Act. The recent experience with the Labor Department's 
Philadelphia ADR Pilot project would seem to confirm this recommendation.72 The general 
conclusion of the report was that the use of agency-initiated ADR efforts had proven to be a 
positive experience in many respects in the several programs where it had been tried.73 The 
report noted that initially, some agency officials were concerned that the agency's 
enforcement reputation would suffer if cases were settled too readily or for too little. After 
the experience with the pilot project, the report stated: 
72
 Alternative Dispute Resolution Steering Committee, Report to the Secretary of Labor on the Philadelphia 
ADR Project, October 14, 1992. 
73
 Id. at 52. 
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enforced by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs at the Labor Department. 
For the most part, that program is not driven by individual complaints and thus there is not a 
backlog at all comparable to that at the EEOC. 
Enforcement of Executive Order 11246 primarily is by compliance reviews scheduled 
by the agency. The issues tend to be highly technical and based upon statistical analyses of 
the racial and gender makeup of the contractor's workforce. Resolution of issues arising in 
compliance reviews is the product of highly technical negotiations between affirmative action 
professionals representing the agency and the contractor. Also, the OFCCP already sets 
fairly strict time schedules to resolve compliance reviews. In that context, the use of an 
outside mediator with no knowledge of the specific issues often would not be necessary. 
Indeed, it is doubtful whether there are very many outside neutrals with expertise in this 
highly complex area. 
e. Occupational Safety and Health Act 
Under OSHA's existing enforcement procedures, the Secretary has the discretion to 
bring an enforcement action. There is no 
private right of action. If citations are issued, the employer has 15 days in which to contest 
the violation and/or proposed penalties to the independent Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission (OSHRC). The initial contest is held before a Commission 
Administrative Law Judge, and the 3-member OSHRC has the discretion to review the ALJ's 
findings and conclusions. Final orders of the OSHRC are appealable to the federal circuit 
courts of appeal. 
Typically in the past, the Secretary of Labor has engaged in settlement negotiations 
with employers in contested cases that result in settlements before the citation is heard by the 
OSHRC. One incentive for the Secretary to engage in settlement negotiations is the fact that 
he bears the burden of proof of establishing the violation in any contested case. While this 
system is far from perfect, the fact that there is no private right of action under the OSH Act 
and the fact that, at least in the past, the Secretary has shown a willingness to engage in 
settlement negotiations have led to a fairly workable mechanism for resolving disputes within 
a reasonable period of time. Accordingly, we do not believe ADR would be necessary in 
OSH A actions. 
Does this mean the current OSHA enforcement procedures cannot be improved? 
Certainly not. For example, as mentioned above, an employer has only 15 days in which to 
contest an OSHA citation. Particularly for medium and smaller businesses that do not have 
an OSHA or legal expert on staff, this short time-frame can operate to preclude them from 
responding in a timely manner. The time-frame in which to contest a citation easily could be 
expanded to 30 days without causing any increased administrative delays. 
To cite another example, under current law OSHA inspectors must cite any instance 
of an alleged violation of an OSHA standard that they discover, even though it may be 
technical in nature and/or an employer has employed alternative measures that effectively 
abate any hazard. The inspector has no discretion to exercise judgment, thus resulting in 
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considerably, well designed committees that are 
supported with adequate training and resources and 
integrated with other organizational policies and practices 
have demonstrated their effectiveness in improving 
workplace safety. 
Again, we would caution that not too much be read into this finding of fact. As 
LPA's own survey shows, the form of employee involvement can vary considerably, even 
within a single establishment. The use of the term "safety and health committee" should not 
connote a template that is applied in every workplace where safety and health issues are 
addressed in a joint manner—the model that would be imposed by COSHRA—but rather the 
fact that safety and health issues are addressed in some form of cooperative 
employer/employee mechanism. The Commission's favorable reference to the Oregon safety 
and health committee requirement suggests that it may be considering recommending some 
form of mandated committee requirement on a national basis. We think this would be a 
mistake. 
A close examination of those states that have some form of mandated safety 
committee requirement reveals that they vary widely, are far less prescriptive, and provide 
much more flexibility than would be permitted by the COSHRA requirement.76 And, 
despite the good things said about the Oregon requirement, in fact, Oregon had its biggest 
improvement in worker's compensation costs after the reform package was enacted, but 
before the committee requirement went into effect. 
More to the point, we urge the Commission not to make a recommendation that 
structured safety and health committees, or even particular elements of a committee, be 
mandated. 
In 1992, the Employment Policy Foundation issued a policy paper entitled "Can 
Employee Involvement Be Mandated?"77 Among its findings, which were based on an 
extensive review of research that had been done on employee involvement: 
• The success of employee involvement efforts depends on the 
ability of the participants to reinforce and sustain high levels of 
trust, an element that cannot be legislated. 
• For cooperative programs to succeed, all parties must actively 
participate and a real commitment must be communicated or 
shown. If the commitment is not already there, legislation 
cannot create it. 
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• A successful program, at least at the outset, needs individuals 
with leadership capacity who have the support of the 
organization and who understand that their role is limited by the 
purpose of the program—to maximize the involvement of all the 
employees. 
• Programs must have a flexible organizational structure that can 
be adapted to the unique needs of the company and its 
employees and that can adjust to the changes in workplace roles 
inevitably caused by successful employee involvement. For this 
very reason, two out of every three employee involvement 
programs do not even have a manual of procedures, thus 
allowing the participants to invent their own programs to meet 
their changing needs. 
We would point out that these finding are fully consistent with the Commission's own 
findings with respect to employee involvement as contained in Chapter II. 
The fact that structured safety and health committees have worked well in some 
workplaces does not justify a particular formula for all workplaces. Instead, we would 
recommend, as we did in our testimony to the Commission at its August 10, 1994, hearing, 
that the Commission recommend changes that will ensure that the progressive changes in 
human resources practice that are being made by employers and employees are protected 
from legal attack. We believe that this is the best way to encourage the successful 
cooperative efforts that are contributing to safer and healthier American workplaces. 
10. Integrated Employment Regulation 
a. Integration and Combination of Existing Agencies Is 
Not Likely To Decrease Their Workload Whereas 
Implementation of ADR Procedures Would. 
At the April 6 hearing of the Commission and in the Report (at page 128) questions 
were raised by Commission members about whether federal agency consolidation or 
reorganization would reduce the caseload of the federal agencies. 
Past experience indicates that it would not. For example, under Reorganization Plan 
No. 1, the EEOC acquired from the Department of Labor the authority over enforcement of 
the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 and the Equal Pay Act.78 That statutory authorization 
simply allowed the transfer of the Labor Department's caseload to die EEOC. Also, at that 
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time, several enforcement personnel from the Labor Department transferred to the EEOC and 
presently are in the EEOC's Legal Counsel's office working on the EEOC's age 
discrimination policies. As we all know, the EEOC's case load continued to expand, and 
Congress has not increased its budget commensurate with the agency's increased workload 
under the ADEA, the EPA or any other statute. 
If the transfer of functions is nothing more than retitling the enforcement functions 
with a common name, there would be no point in making the change. As the previous 
discussion indicates, unless some fundamental changes are made in the case handling and 
resolution process—such as mediation and arbitration—the governmental agencies simply will 
not be able to handle the rearranged workload. 
Moreover, at the last hearing, the Committee discussed the possibility of merging the 
EEOC with the NLRB. In our view, this move would create needless confusion and 
intermingle very different statutes. By comparison with the EEOC, the NLRB has a much 
smaller constituency and administers a statute which is technically very different than the 
ones handled by EEOC. As set out below, however, the NLRB enforcement scheme should 
be considered as an alternative to the present enforcement system under other employment 
statutes. 
b. Consolidation, Accompanied By Fundamental Changes 
In Procedure, May Be Worth Considering 
Consolidation, however, might merit some consideration if, and only if, it were 
accompanied by changes in procedure that would improve the enforcement process, such as: 
1. Establishing at the front end of the enforcement process a 
system that stresses the use of alternative dispute resolution 
systems to resolve as many employment cases as possible to 
reduce the involvement of the federal agencies and courts. 
2. Implementing new ADR procedures such as those outlined 
above. For those cases that cannot be settled informally, having 
those cases tried before federal administrative law judges with 
review before an agency panel or in the U.S. courts. Consistent 
with our recommendation below that the NLRB model be 
followed, review of agency decisions would be before the U.S. 
courts of appeals. 
3. Extending the concept of the NLRB General Counsel's 
unreviewable discretion in deciding whether a charge is 
meritorious to all federal employment laws, thus establishing a 
mechanism to keep cases without merit from reaching the 
federal courts. A detailed proposal to implement this concept is 
found in H.R. 4889, the "Fair Employment Reform and 
Consolidation Act of 1990," introduced by Rep. Steve Bartlett 
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on May 23, 1990. At the same time, eliminating the private 
right of action now found in employment laws. 
4. Developing a better system of selecting NLRB/Commission 
members to avoid the political wars that have accompanied the 
current process. H.R. 1466, introduced in 1994 by Rep. Major 
Owens (D-NY) would be a good first step in implementing this 
recommendation. 
5. Devising a more rational penalty/remedial scheme that would 
discourage litigation in search of high-stakes jury awards. The 
present system has greatly increased the EEOC's caseload in 
return for a "lottery-like" jury system {Report at page 113) that 
discourages the option of viable alternative dispute resolution 
procedures. Indeed, the American Civil Liberties Union 
testified before the Commission that over 70 percent of those 
persons who feel they have a statutory claim cannot even find an 
attorney who will take their case. 
6. Ending the practice of using the federal workplace laws (such as 
OSHA and the FLSA) for revenue raising purposes. In recent 
years, both Congress and the Administration have begun to 
increase fines and penalties under the labor laws for the express 
purpose of deficit reduction. Such an approach to enforcement 
indicates that the federal government is becoming more 
interested in raising revenue than in achieving the underlying 
goals of these laws. 
7. Establishing safeguards to protect the federal employment laws 
from being used by unions for corporate campaign purposes. 
8. Barring a charging party from instituting similar enforcement 
actions in multiple forums. Alternatively, requiring that the 
results in one forum (such as the results of arbitration) be 
considering binding or res judicata for all other forums. 
9. Preempting all similar state and local laws to provide uniformity 
in U.S. employment laws. 
c. Specialized Labor Court 
As above, we preface our comments in this section with our view that any successful 
system for handling employment cases must be integrated with an effective alternative dispute 
resolution procedure. 
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From a general perspective, there are two likely views that may be taken about 
specialized labor courts. Some will feel that it is better to use courts of general jurisdiction 
(such as the federal district courts) because they are accustomed to dealing with a variety of 
issues and will not become overly-familiar with or captives of pre-conceived opinions about 
the technicalities of specific statutes. Also, using courts of general jurisdiction spreads the 
workload throughout the entire court system and does not overload a specialty court. 
Others may feel that these laws are so technical that it is better to have specialized 
courts (such as the federal Bankruptcy or the Federal Circuit) concentrate on those cases. 
From a more specific, practical viewpoint, there will be concerns that a specialized 
court may be predominated by judges who tend to favor one side or the other. Opinions 
often will vary depending upon the political party that will make the nominations or the 
possibility that the judges may tend to favor one side or the other. For example, unions and 
plaintiffs' attorneys usually express displeasure that the federal bench is largely made up of 
appointees of Presidents Reagan and Bush. On the other hand, employers are likely to 
oppose a new court system largely appointed by a Democratic administration. To be 
perfectly candid about it, the political composition of the Commission on the Future of 
Worker/Management Relations is an excellent case in point. 
The experience of European labor courts also gives employers much concern. The 
employer perception is that the labor courts primarily are pro-labor, and American employers 
are concerned that a similar result could occur in the United States. 
In short, all sides are likely to be concerned about the fairness of a labor court 
system, and it is unlikely that such fairness can be assured to an extent that both sides will be 
satisfied with that system. From a political standpoint, therefore, the idea of labor courts are 
likely to have substantial opposition. 
Conclusion 
There is no question whatsoever that the EEOC and the courts have become 
overwhelmed by the growing number of employment discrimination charges and lawsuits. 
Increased resources from Congress are not likely, but even if they were, it is in the public 
interest to seek less acrimonious, less expensive and more timely alternatives to the present 
system. We urge the Commission to give full consideration to all available alternatives and 
issue recommendation that would establish the flexibility needed to encourage prompt and 
fair resolution of employment discrimination claims. 
